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States for a possible end to its trade embargo 
with Japan while simultaneously preparing 
the nation for war. "If Japan's hundred mil-
lions merge and go forward," he declared, 
"wars can be won with ease." When it 
became apparent that U.S. President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt would not rescind his demand 
for a Japanese evacuation of China, Tojo 
authorized the navy to ,attack U.S. military 
installations in Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, 
and elsewhere in December 1941. 
The initial phase of World War II in the 
Pacific was characterized by a lightning 
series of Japanese victories over British and 
U.S. forces. These successes boosted Tojo's 
prestige at home and led to greater accep-
tance of his views on the legitimacy of 
force. By June 1942, however, the U.S. vic-
tory at the Battle of Midway had stopped 
Japanese expansion in its tracks and com-
menced a long string of heavy defeats. By 
1943, Tojo had assumed the additional post 
of Military Procurement Minister, and the 
following year, he became Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff. When the fall of Saipan in 
July 1944 placed Japan in the range of U.S. 
bombers, however, Prince Konoe arranged 
for Tojo's dismissal as Prime Minister. 
When Allied authorities came to his resi-
dence with an arrest warrant, Tojo tried and 
failed to kill himself. Upon recovering, he 
was put on trial by an international war tribu-
nal for crimes against humanity and was 
sentenced to death. He accepted all respon-
sibility for the outbreak of hostilities to 
absolve the emperor of any blame. He was 
subsequently hanged on December 23, 1948. 
John C. Fredriksen 
See also: February 26 Incident; International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East; Ishiwara 
Kanji; Konoe Fumimaro; Kwantung Army 
Adventurism; ShOwa Emperor (Hirohito); Tri-
partite Pact; World War II, Pacific Theater. 
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Tokugawa Bakufu Political 
System 
The Tokugawa bakufu political system 
represented a mixture of pre-Tokugawa sho-
gunal institutions and innovations imple-
mented by the early Tokugawa shogun. 
Hereditary daimyo continued to rule over 
semi-autonomous domains, relying on their 
own lands for resources, and supported by 
samurai loyal only to them. The shogunate 
established a general set of rules for main-
taining tenuous control over the daimyo, 
but relied upon daimyo cooperation to main-
tain domestic stability and even interna-
tional relations-for example, by asking 
daimyo to engage with the Ryukyu King-
dom, Korea, and the Ezo lands to the north. 
The Tokugawa shOgunate devoted its atten-
tion to a centered, but not centralized, rule 
over Japan. Much of its administration was 
focused in Edo and, to a lesser extent, the 
surrounding Kanto region, with offices in 
key cities such as Osaka, Kyoto, and Naga-
saki. In many ways, however, the Tokugawa 
shogunate mirrored the domains. For exam-
ple, it depended on its own lands-nearly 
one-fourth of all land in Japan-for eco-
nomic resources. Likewise, it created similar 
recruitment and promotion structures for its 
own samurai. 
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Of the nearly 22,500 Tokugawa samurai, 
nearly 17,000 worked within the shOgu-
nate's bureaucracy. Many of these samurai 
received little compensation and were gen-
erally underemployed; some even struck 
out on their own as ronin, finding various 
odd jobs where they could. Managing these 
lower-ranked samurai, often called "house-
men" (gokenin), was a constant struggle for 
the shogunate. The regime wanted house-
men to use their time constructively-for 
example, by maintaining preparation for 
possible military activity. Some acted as 
intendents who managed the Tokugawa 
lands located throughout the Kanto plain 
that surrounded Edo. Others worked as 
minor functionaries in the various magis-
trate offices. The rest of the Tokugawa 
liege vassals, known as the "bannermen" 
(hatamoto), ranged in rank and income 
from 500 to 9,500 koku, a rank just below 
daimyo. Although many were indistinguish-
able from housemen, bannermen could 
theoretically claim special privileges-for 
example, having an audience with the 
shogun. Bannermen staffed the mid-level 
bureaucratic positions: the Edo city magis-
trate, commissioners of finance and foreign 
relations, and inspectors. Each position 
brought with it financial benefits on top of 
their hereditary stipends. More importantly, 
these roles gave ambitious vassals a chance 
to affect Tokugawa policy. A small percent-
age of bannermen also managed fiefs, simi-
lar to daimyo domains, from which they 
could draw material and human resources. 
Above the liege vassal samurai were the 
vassal daimyo (judai), whose putatively 
close connection to the Tokugawa progenitor, 
Ieyasu, made them trustworthy for protecting 
the Tokugawa realm. This group also staffed 
the higher posts, such as the Keeper of 
Osaka Castle, the Kyoto Deputy, Master 
of Court Ceremony, and the Magistrate of 
Temples and Shrines. More importantly, 
they filled the highest positions, acting as 
the junior and senior councilors who set 
Tokugawa policy. Although the title "Great 
Councilor" (tairo) existed, it was largely 
titular, except when it was occupied by Ii 
Naosuke. None of the previously described 
positions were permanent, and mechanisms 
were in place to break political impasses, 
such as the ability to create ad hoc commit-
tees, create new magistrate offices, or assign 
trusted men to concurrent positions. Some 
office-holding daimyo were essentially glori-
fied bannermen: they might have small fiefs, 
but lacked the castle stronghold that defined 
the classic image of a daimyo. Instead, they 
spent most of their time in Edo focused on 
their shogunate duties. 
Many of the roughly 23 Tokugawa-relative 
daimyo (shimpan) were, like the outer 
daimyo (tozama), shut out from formal sho-
gunate positions. Nevertheless, the "Three 
Houses" (sanke) were important because 
they provided a pool of heirs should the sho-
gun fail to produce one. Moreover, the small-
est of the three, the Mito domain, maintained 
a hereditary role, by custom, as adviser to the 
shOgun. Although close to the Tokugawa leg-
acy, the proximity of these domains did not 
lead to simple acquiescence to the shogu-
nate. In Mito's case, the early 19th-century 
daimyo, Tokugawa Nariaki, criticized the 
Tokugawa shOgunate for not "expelling the 
barbarians" from Japan. 
Several informal channels existed within 
the shOgunate that allowed outsiders to gain 
at least a minority voice. Daimyo, regardless 
of their status, as well as noble families 
in Kyoto could influence the shOgun and 
shOgunal politics through their "women of 
the great interior" (Ooku)-hundreds of 
women who served the shogun and managed 
his domestic needs. Thus they played an 
important function in the political cliques 

